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NOTE
"NEW AGE" OR NEW TESTAMENT?:
TOWARD A MORE FAITHFUL
INTERPRETATION OF "RELIGION"
[A] religion even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be
hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it.
- Sigmund Freud'
Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula where-
with to embellish a comfortable life ....
-Alfred North Whitehead2
Now is a great time for new religions to pop up. There are peo-
ple who get religious about jogging, they get religious about sex
. ..Health foods. . .ESP, of course, flying saucers, anything is
fertile ground now. There's a new messiah born every day.
- Tom Wolf
The first amendment, in unequivocal language,4 announces the
primacy afforded religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."'5 With these words, the framers conferred special consti-
tutional status on religion; one might also expect some sense of its
interpretation. However, this first of our fundamental rights re-
mains silent on its meaning.
1 S. FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 30 (J. Strachey trans. &
ed. 1959).
2 A. WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 269-70 (1925).
3 TWENTY YEARS OF ROLLING STONE: WHAT A LONG, STRANGE TRIP IT'S BEEN 340 (J.S.
Wenner ed. 1987).
1 See Blackmun, The First Amendment and Its Religion Clauses: Where Are We?
Where Are We Going?, 14 NoVA L. REV. 29, 31 (1989).
'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Consensus on religion's meaning eludes scholars and courts
alike.' The formulation of a workable definition particularly con-
fronts the judiciary with an unyielding conundrum. Although
much has been written about the constitutional meaning of reli-
gion, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a precise definition.8
Most judicial opinions even approaching the question have scrupu-
lously avoided the "delicate task."9 Nor have scholars been able to
agree; the appropriate interpretation of religion has generated con-
siderable debate in the current academic literature. 10 Judicial and
scholarly commentary thus do little to illumine the significant dif-
ferences between religious and other philosophical or moral, but
nonreligious, belief systems.
Yet the formulation of a workable definition is critical. Reli-
gious fervor is on the rise.1 The upsurge is reflected not only in
the burgeoning fundamentalist right,12 but also in an explosion of
"New Age" beliefs and practices:" crystal visions, past-life regres-
sions, astral projections, Rolfing, channeling, harmonic conver-
gence.1 4 With the growth of such divergent perspectives, our con-
6 See Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1989).
1 Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1663
(1989); Ingber, supra note 6, at 233.
' See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 7, at 1665; Freeman, The Misguided Search for
the Constitutional Definition of "Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1524 (1983); Note, Defining
"Religion" in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 532
(1989).
9 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
10 See infra notes 90-121 and accompanying text.
Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1258, 1258 (1989) ("[a]bout ninety-five percent of Americans believe in God or some
universal spirit [and participate in] more than 1,200 primary religious groups and their in-
numerable individualized variations") (citation omitted); see H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECU-
LAR CITY 12 (1984) (religion is "staging a comeback"); see, e.g., Ball, Normal Religion in
America, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397, 399-403 (1990) (examining President
Bush's use of prayer and religious language in inaugural address).
12 See Ingber, supra note 6, at 234-37 (analyzing religious fundamentalists' response to
perceived threat of secular humanist values in public school education).
S See J. NAISBiTr & P. AUBERDENE, MEGATRENDS 2000: TEN NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE
1990's 280-84 (1990).
"' See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1989, at A26, col. 5 (spiritual movement reflected in New
Age religions); The Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1988, at C6, col. 3 (Government Services Adminis-
tration building transformed into "supermarket for New Age religions"). Adherents to these
nontraditional mystical experiences emphasize their techniques as a means to universal
peace, personal fulfillment, and productive worth. See J. PRICE, THE PLANETARY COMMISSION
passim (1984) ("New Age" religion consists of world beliefs, psychology and self-improve-
ment). But see Paradise Under Siege: A New Age Guru Prepares for War in Montana,
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ception of the religious has concomitantly expanded.15 As the
commonality of our beliefs has declined, the sacred and the secular
increasingly have merged.16
Inherent to our pluralistic understanding of state tolerance is
a wide diversity of religious beliefs.17 Assessing either establish-
ment or free exercise claims in the face of government action re-
quires a workable definition that enables courts to distinguish
fairly between the religious and nonreligious, without imposing
ethnocentric or majoritarian values.
Until recently, the Supreme Court's modern interpretation of
free exercise exempted individuals from an otherwise permissible
governmental action when it interfered with the adherent's reli-
gious beliefs or practices.' However, in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,19 the Court
seemed to apply a new-and confusing-standard that, by deval-
uing the primacy of minority belief practices, redefined the scope
of religion.20 The Court's treatment of religion in Smith implicitly
undermines the pluralistic values undergirding the first amend-
ment and promotes mainstream "established" beliefs as the
standard.
This Note seeks to unravel the efforts by courts and commen-
tators to define religion. I examine the framers' perspectives on the
TIME, Aug. 28, 1989, at 61 (Church Universal and Triumphant leader Elizabeth Clare
Prophet exhorts members of New Age survivalist group to stockpile weapons).
" See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERCA RELIGIONS (2d ed. 1987) (listing 1,347 religions in
U.S.); Note, supra note 11, at 1258-59.
16 See Underkuffler, "Discrimination" on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of
Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 581, 603 (1989); see
also McBride, "Is Nothing Sacred?": Flag Desecration, The Constitution and the Estab-
lishment of Religion, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 297, 299-300 (1991) (flag protection amendment
seen as instance of civil religion).
1 Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First Amendment, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 681, 694 (1989).
11 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (Court disallowed state law compel-
ling Amish children to receive formal education until age sixteen); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 410 (1963) (Court disallowed state denial of unemployment compensation benefits
to Seventh Day Adventist due to his refusal to work on Sabbath); see also McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409,
1416-17 (1990). But see Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595, 1599-61 (1990) (Court upheld state denial of unemployment compensation benefits to
Native American Church members due to their religiously inspired use of sacramental
peyote).
19 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
20 See Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Ingestion of Illegal Drugs for
Religious Purposes Is Not Protected by the Constitution, 21 SETON HALL 111, 112 (1990).
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meaning of religion, explore judicial attempts to circumscribe a
definition, and critique current scholarly commentary. I advocate a
flexible, unitary approach grounded in transcendence and advanc-
ing pluralism to preserve the fundamental purposes of our first
amendment's protection of religious liberty.
I. THE FRAMERS' PERSPECTIVES
Little certitude concerning the framers' conception of the
meaning of religion can be gained from studying the historical rec-
ord. Yet we do know that, almost uniformly, they equated religion
with belief in God; 21 this view, however, can be understood to em-
brace "transcendent extrapersonal authorities" not traditionally
included in theistic systems.22 Perhaps the model was descriptive
rather than proscriptive, aiming to provide a neutral definition
that would not discriminate against unorthodox believers.23 But
the framers' perspective was substantially limited by their society's
homogeneity: even the unorthodox believers of the time appear to
have been theists.24 Moreover, the drafters of the Bill of Rights
employed successively changing language before adopting "free ex-
ercise of religion" for the first amendment.25 Their insertion and
later rejection of "rights of conscience" language can lead to two
polar conclusions: either that the first amendment was not in-
tended to protect other than purely religious liberty; or that usage
of "freedom of conscience," subsumable under the right of free ex-
ercise, would be redundant.26 Such a history offers ambiguous as-
sistance at best.
Nonetheless, the framers did indicate, in three distinct ap-
proaches, the functional importance of protecting religious belief.
Roger Williams maintained that it necessarily sheltered the auton-
omy of the Church from intrusive governmental action.2 7 Thomas
21 L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 71-136 (rev. ed. 1967) (describing influences
of framers' religious beliefs on meaning of religion clauses); see, e.g., VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS OF
1776, art. 16; JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 51-52 (R. Alley ed. 1985).
22 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1493.
22 Freeman, supra note 8, at 1521; see also Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1060 (1978) (cannot read founders' equation of religion and
theism as denying religious character of nontheism).
2 Adams & Emmerich, supra note 7, at 1665; McConnell, supra note 18, at 1493-94.
2 See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1488-90 (discussing implications of selection of
"free exercise of religion" over "rights of conscience").
26 Freeman, supra note 8, at 1522; McConnell, supra note 18, at 1490-93.
27 R. WILLIAMS, THE BLOUDY TENET OF PERSECUTION, FOR CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE
[Vol. 65:365
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Jefferson asserted that it fundamentally safeguarded secular inter-
ests from encroaching religious influence.2 8 James Madison, how-
ever, understood that religious and secular interests alike were ad-
vanced by diffusing and decentralizing power;29 both religion and
government could reach their independent goals only if each were
allowed to flourish in its own sphere.30 This pluralistic perspective
supports an expansive understanding of religious belief, welcoming
diversity and dissension rather than confining religion to the
norms of traditional belief systems.3
How much influence the framers' understanding of religion
should bear in determining a current constitutional definition is
much contested. 2
Searches for original intent run a significant risk of devolving into
identification of the most serviceable purpose. Emphasis upon the
aims of one framer, or even of the entire assemblage of constitu-
tional architects, also risks investment in a manifestly imperfect
body and guesswork, while discounting the ability of subsequent
generations to engage in a critical aspect of self-governance.33
Despite the inconclusive record, and its much debatable weight,
(London 1644), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 3-5 (Russell &
Russell, Inc. ed. 1963).
28 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1449-50 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr.
Benjamin Waterhouse (June 26, 1822)). Jefferson was especially hostile to all but the most
sanitized version of Christianity, finding value only in the bland rationality of Unitarianism.
Id. at 1449-51. He constricted the right of free exercise to belief alone, eliminating from his
conception any protection of religious practice. The Supreme Court later espoused this Jef-
fersonian notion, holding that free exercise could not exempt an individual from a generally
applicable law regulating conduct for the benefit of society. Id. at 1451; see Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). The doctrine substantially colors, and therefore im-
pairs, the Court's recent analysis in Smith. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-02; infra notes 75-
89 and accompanying text.
29 TnE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison).
30 See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1515.
31 Id. at 1516. But see Freeman, supra note 8, at 1522 (traditional atheism not religion).
Professor Freeman, among others, persuasively argues that the founders intended to protect
freedom of conscience only to the extent that it proceeded from religious convictions. They
did not intend to protect freedom of conscience per se. Id. Freeman therefore comprehends
the government's duty under the first amendment as neither to restrict nor to require reli-
gious adherence. Id. at 1522-23. The nonbeliever is protected ohly in her guaranteed right
not to practice or support religion. Id. at 1523.
32 See, e.g., Adams & Emmerich, supra note 7, at 1666 (framers' views inadequate to
meet challenges of 20th century America); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 214, 216-17 (1980) (framers' intentions insufficient pro-
tection for interpreting fundamental values); Lively, supra note 17 (constitutional interests
little served by extrapolating principle from among competing historical perspectives).
33 Lively, supra note 17.
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the framers' conceptions can ground a constitutional understand-
ing of religions if-perhaps only if-the underlying purposes of the
first amendment constitute the foundational framework from
which judicial interpretation proceeds.3 4
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Supreme Court's Expansive Analysis
Until the pivotal Torcaso v. Watkins35 decision thirty years
ago, the Supreme Court had been surprisingly silent on the mean-
ing of religion. It had suggested definitional perimeters in only four
earlier cases. In Davis v. Beason, s the Court adopted a traditional
theistic view in upholding anti-Mormon policies (i.e., prosecutions
of bigamists, and conditioning of voting eligibility on an anti-big-
amy oath).37 The Court echoed that sentiment forty years later in
United States v. Macintosh,"5 when it rejected the naturalization
privilege of an alien refusing to bear arms for religious reasons.39
Yet even while affirming theism as a necessary feature of religion,40
the Macintosh Court experienced discomfort in authenticating re-
ligious claims: "What constitutes free exercise of religion cannot
perhaps be dogmatically determined. It is a case where this Court
must pick out a line, between conscience and a command of the
State.""'
This shift of focus was more fully realized in United States v.
34 See McBride, Religion and the First Amendment: An Inquiry into the Presupposi-
tions of the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention," 6 J.L. & REUG. 1, 8 (1988) (narrowly
defined original intent informative but cannot subvert constitutional purposes in judicial
interpretation). Original intent analysis can limit the first amendment's purposes to preserv-
ing only "religion" as the framers understood it, rather than "religion" in whatever form it
may exist.
38 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
36 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
" Id. at 342 ("religion" refers to "one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the
obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his
will").
38 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
39 Id. at 633-34 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) ("essence of religion is belief in a relation to
God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation").
40 See id. at 625 ("We are a Christian people, according to one another the equal right
of religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the will of
God").
Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 65:365
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Ballard.42 Without directly announcing a definitional standard, the
Ballard Court stated that religious freedom incorporates "the right
to maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which
are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths."4 Again, in
Fowler v. Rhode Island," the Court implied that any attempt to
confine religion to theism was probably unconstitutional;45 courts
cannot mandate that "what is religious practice or activity for one
group is not religion under the protection of the First
Amendment."'46
Then, in its landmark Torcaso decision, the Court struck
down a Maryland statute requiring public officials to profess belief
in God upon assuming office.47 The Torcaso Court boldly chartered
new ground; it characterized the provision as unconstitutional be-
cause it burdened both nonbelievers and those believers whose
faith was not grounded in belief in God.4s Although the Torcaso
Court expressly rejected any necessary constitutional connection
between religion and theism, its simple sincerity test hardly ad-
vanced free exercise analysis.49 Torcaso failed to enunciate any
workable guidelines for distinguishing religious from nonreligious
beliefs and practices.50 That task was accomplished four years later
in a decision that sweepingly reimagined first amendment religion
jurisprudence.
In United States v. Seeger,51 the Court introduced the con-
cept of "ultimate concern" as the dispositive criterion for deter-
mining the existence of religious belief. Seeger, opposing war be-
cause of a "religious faith in a purely ethical creed,"52 required the
42 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
43 Id. at 86 (legitimacy of defendant's religious beliefs properly withheld from jury scru-
tiny in fraud case). The Ballard Court did, however, permit judicial inquiry into the sincer-
ity of the adherent's beliefs. Id. at 86-87.
" 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
Id. at 69 (dictum).
Id. at 70 (finding ban of religious speeches in public park unconstitutional because
applicable only to Jehovah's Witnesses).
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 492-95.
'8 Id. at 495. Included in this latter group are followers of "Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, Secular Humanism and others." Id. at 495 n.11.
4" See McBride, Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court: Tillich's "Ultimate Concern" as
a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. CHURCH & STATE 244, 252 (1988) ("How could
simply an affective attitude, i.e., sincerity alone, be construed as the determinative charac-
teristic of religious faith?").
50 Freeman, supra note 8, at 1525.
5- 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
52 Id. at 166.
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Court to interpret the meaning of religion within the federal con-
scription statute.5 3 Drawing on the work of several preeminent
theologians, particularly that of Paul Tillich, the Court reasoned
that the statute's "religious training and belief" would encompass
"all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or be-
ing, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent. ' 54 The Seeger Court thus articu-
lated a "functional test"55 that examined whether a "sincere and
meaningful" belief "occupies a place in the life of its possessor par-
allel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption." 56 The test, fashioned almost directly
in Tillich's phenomenological terms,57 manifests the Court's under-
standing of religion, statutorily and constitutionally, as grounded
in Tillich's expansive conception.5
The Supreme Court further enlarged its definitional standard
in Welsh v. United States,5  another draft-exemption case. Al-
13 The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j)
(1964). The section exempted from military service any individual
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war of any form. [Religious training and belief in this connection
means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but] .... does not include
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal
moral code.
Id. (amended in 1967 to strike provision in brackets). Although the Seeger Court's definition
of religion is primarily statutory, it is generally understood to have constitutional implica-
tions. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Develop-
ment-Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1425 (1967) (See-
ger definition applicable to constitutional interpretation); Note, supra note 23, at 1064
(Seeger definition required for constitutional purposes). For a comprehensive analysis of the
applicability of the Seeger definition to constitutional interpretation, see McBride, supra
note 49, at 254-60.
" Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
"5 Because the definition focuses exclusively on the role that an individual's beliefs play
in her life, the test has been aptly named the "functional definition [of religion]." See L.
TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1182 (2d ed. 1988); Freeman, supra note 8, at 1526
n.54; Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 752, 754
(1984).
56 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
'7 See P. TLLiCH, SHAKING THE FOUNDATIONS 63 (1962).
The name of this infinite and unexhaustible depth and ground of all being is God.
That depth is what the word God means. And if that word has not much meaning
for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your
being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without reservation.
Id. (emphasis added).
11 See McBride, supra note 49, at 257.
5, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
[Vol. 65:365
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though Welsh characterized his opposition to war as unrelated in
any way to religion,6 ° the Court declined to find this factor disposi-
tive. Rather, it held that Welsh could only be denied an exemption
if his beliefs were neither deeply held, nor at all resting on "moral,
ethical or religious principles," but wholly "upon considerations of
policy, pragmatism, or expediency."'" Welsh-Seeger therefore de-
fine religion as that set of beliefs which addresses matters of ulti-
mate concern parallel to the position that God holds for tradition-
ally religious adherents.6 2
Such an all-encompassing definition has perhaps been tem-
pered by the Court's later commentary. 3 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,64
the Court hesitated to define religion in functional terms, espe-
cially those embracing solely personal philosophical standards.6 5
Ordered liberty, the Court reasoned, precludes allowing each per-
son to establish her own standards on matters of conduct in which
society has significant interests. After asserting that the protection
of the religion clauses extends only to claims "rooted in religious
belief,"66 Chief Justice Burger contrasted the Amish beliefs with
what he identified as philosophical ones:
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values ac-
cepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social val-
ues of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philo-
sophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does
not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. 7
60 Id. at 341. Welsh maintained that his beliefs were drawn from his sociological and
historical readings. Id.
61 Id. at 342-43. Unable to classify Welsh's claims under the latter three descriptions,
the Court held that he was entitled to an exemption. Id. at 343-44.
62 Comment, Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. ILL. U.L.J.
357, 365 (1989).
13 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (denying unemployment com-
pensation to Jehovah's Witness refusing to manufacture weapons violates free exercise);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (imposing mandatory attendance on Amish
children past eighth grade violates free exercise).
64 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"I See id. at 215.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 216. The Yoder Court's identification of Thoreau as its paradigm of the solely
secular believer is especially confusing given his belief in both a personal God and in tran-
scendent reality. Freeman, supra note 8, at 1549-50. What Thoreau rejected was the "de-
based 'Christianity' of his time." Willey, Introduction to WALDEN 12 (1951); see also H.D.
THOREAU, WALDEN 238 (1951) ("Man flows at once to God when the channel of purity is
open").
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However, Yoder does not necessarily retreat from the standard es-
tablished in Seeger.5 Because the state of Wisconsin was not con-
testing the religiosity of the Amish practices, the question of reli-
gion was not squarely before the Court. Therefore, the religion/
philosophy distinction may not disturb the Welsh-Seeger ap-
proach. Moreover, despite its rhetoric, the Court in Yoder simply
failed to explain what distinguishes a religious belief from a purely
secular one. 9
Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Board,70 the Court alluded to a
classification scheme without formulating an applicable standard.
The Thomas Court suggested that some claims may be "so bi-
zarre" as to be "clearly nonreligious."' 71 However, without more,
this language contributes little to a usable definition. Thus, the Su-
preme Court, even in its express analysis of religion's constitu-
tional meaning, remains inarticulate on the essential criteria for
differentiating "clearly nonreligious" claims from those that fall
under the protection of the first amendment. 2
6 See Note, supra note 8, at 539.
" See Freeman, supra note 8, at 1528.
7o 450 U.S. 707 (1983).
71 Id. at 715.
71 Some circuit courts have applied themselves to the task of constitutionally defining
"religion." See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
908 (1982); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d
Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979); Founding Church of Scientology of
Wash. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
In Founding Church, the court classified Scientology as a religion, despite its rejection
of the supernatural; Scientology's structural similarity to Eastern religions persuaded the
court that it would satisfy first amendment requirements. Id. at 1160 (scope of system's
underlying account for humanity's place in cosmos likened to "those of some recognized
religions"). The court additionally noted Scientology's aims to improve humanity's spiritual
condition, its incorporation as a religion in the District of Columbia, and the state licensing
of its ministers. Id.
The Second Circuit applied the Seeger test of "ultimate concern" to find Krishna Con-
sciousness a religion. Krishna Consciousness, 650 F.2d at 440. The court examined the func-
tion that Krishna Consciousness plays in the life of a follower and concluded that
"[aldherence to the sect's theological doctrines is an 'ultimate concern.'" Id. The court es-
pecially looked to the belief system's resemblance to traditional religions: its outgrowth from
"the ancient and diverse Hindu tradition"; its large worldwide following; its "elaborately
articulated body of religious doctrine"; and its recognized non-profit tax-exempt status ac-
corded by both the State of New York and the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 440-41.
Nonetheless, the court's opinion did not suggest that the traditional elements alone, apart
from the existence of an "ultimate concern," would suffice. See Freeman, supra note 8, at
1529.
The Third Circuit, in two recent cases, has attempted to articulate a comprehensive
definition of religion. In Malnah v. Yogi, the court found Transcendental Meditation a reli-
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B. Implications from Smith
The free exercise clause represents a still radical concept of
government and its subordinated relationship, to claims of higher
truth and authority.7 3 However, its interpretation is substantially
hampered by the Court's inconsistent treatment of religious ex-
emptions. Under modern exemption doctrine, the claimant asserts
that compliance with a governmental law or practice seriously bur-
dens her right to freely exercise her religion. The Court has previ-
ously acknowledged the significance of exemptions for employment
gion for constitutional purposes. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 199 (affirming district court's ruling
that New Jersey public schools' adoption of Transcendental Meditation techniques violated
establishment clause). The majority opinion noted the questioned teaching's inclusion of
significant religious rituals (especially chanting and ceremonial student offerings of fruit and
flowers to deities) as indicative of its religious nature. Id. at 198. Judge Adams concurred,
but wrote separately to address more thoroughly the necessary features of religion. Id. at
207-10 (Adams, J., concurring).
Judge Adams characterized the modern approach as "definition by analogy." Id. at 207
(Adams, J., concurring). The approach compares any new set of beliefs- to "the unquestioned
and accepted 'religions'" in order to determine whether it is "confronting the same con-
cerns, or serving the same purposes." Id. (Adams, J., concurring) He emphasized "three
useful indicia" that promote underlying constitutional values: the "'ultimate' nature of the
ideas presented" by the belief system, its claim to an "ultimate and comprehensive 'truth,'"
and its "formal, external" conformity to accepted religions. Id. at 207-09 (Adams, J.,
concurring).
In a subsequent refinement, Judge Adams, writing for the court in Africa v. Pennsylva-
nia, minimized the significance of a belief's comprehensive treatment of ultimate questions,
662 F.2d at 1025. Instead, the Africa court revised the Malnak approach in accordance with
Yoder:
[T]he free exercise clause does not protect all deeply held beliefs, however "ulti-
mate" their ends or all-consuming their means. An individual or group may ad-
here to and profess certain political, economic, or social doctrines, perhaps quite
passionately. The first amendment, though, has not been construed, at least as
yet, to shelter strongly held ideologies of such a nature, however all-encompassing.
... [T]o have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in
religious belief.
Id. at 1034 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215). The court then incorporated into its analysis
the three indicia originally voiced in Judge Adams' concurrence in Malnak: the ultimacy of
fundamental questions, the comprehensiveness of the system, and the extent to which its
structure parallels that of accepted religions. Id. at 1034-36; see also Adams & Emmerich,
supra note 7 (further revision of Judge Adams' approach).
These circuit court opinions demonstrate a spectrum of alternative theories: the Barber
decision imposes no additional restrictions to the ultimacy criterion developed under Welsh-
Seeger; the majority opinion in Scientology and the concurrence by Judge Adams in
Malnak narrow the "ultimate concern" test by requiring a comprehensive accounting for
humanity's place in the universe; the Africa decision most substantially departs from Seeger
and Welsh by adhering to the dicta in Yoder. Together they emphasize the need for an
explicit coordinated definition.
7 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1513.
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cases. However, it has granted exemptions only infrequently, and
without reference to any predictable standard. 4
Most recently, in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,6 the Supreme Court ex-
amined the free exercise claims of two Native Americans denied
unemployment compensation due to religiously inspired use of the
hallucinogen peyote. Drug rehabilitation counselors Alfred Smith
and Galen Black were fired from their jobs after ingesting peyote
during a Native American Church service. After hearing their ap-
plication for unemployment benefits, the responsible Oregon state
agency denied their claim.76
The agency concluded that the use of peyote, a felony under
Oregon criminal law, constituted work-related misconduct. Oregon
law precluded individuals engaging in such misconduct from re-
ceiving benefits.77 Although Smith and Black asserted that inges-
tion of peyote was a central tenet of the Native American Church,
the Supreme Court affirmed Oregon's denial of unemployment
compensation, and rejected the free exercise exemption.7 8
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, offered an opinion signifi-
cantly departing from prior free exercise jurisprudence. He sug-
gested that the Court's earlier extensions of free exercise exemp-
tions were limited to cases involving another constitutional right,
such as free speech or freedom of the press. Because Smith and
Black could proffer nothing but a bare free exercise claim, they
"' See Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 933-34 (1989) (free exercise boundary can be restrictive or
expansive); Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67
MINN. L. REv. 545, 548 (1983) (religious exemptions only sporadically written into regula-
tions of general applicability). Some commentators suggest that the Court's jurisprudence
has only fitfully recognized religious exemptions in unemployment compensation cases. See
Gregory & Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not "Them"!): The Troubled Jurisprudence of Reli-
gious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 273, 273 n.3 (1991); see, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 146 (1987) (state's denial of unemployment compensation
violated free exercise); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 706 (1986) (state's refusal to exempt
individual from requirement restricting free exercise properly accomplishes overriding gov-
ernment interest); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (state justified restric-
tion on religious liberty by demonstrating its necessity to achieve overriding government
interest); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18 (state's denial of unemployment compensation vio-
lated free exercise); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (state's interest must be balanced against right
of religious liberty); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (denial of unemployment
compensation violated free exercise).
- 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
76 Id. at 1597-98.
" Id. at 1598.
78 Id. at 1597-1600.
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were not entitled to a religious exemption.79
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion disavowed the major-
ity's view of free exercise claims. Although acknowledging that Or-
egon's criminal classification of peyote use "places a severe burden
on the ability of respondents to freely exercise their religion,"' 0
Justice O'Connor agreed that the Court could rightfully deny their
free exercise claims. Oregon's "compelling interest" in preventing
the distribution of dangerous drugs precluded exempting the use of
peyote.8 1
The dissenters in Smith found the state's interest to be less
than compelling; Oregon had offered no evidence that the religious
use of peyote was harmful."2 Moreover, peyote's "distribution for
use in religious rituals has nothing to do with the vast and violent
traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues the country. ' 83 Justice
Blackmun would therefore have exempted Smith and Black from
the Oregon statute, and awarded them unemployment benefits.
Smith seems to illustrate the Court's unwillingness to recog-
nize less familiar religious claims. Although the Court did not con-
sider the religiosity of the believers' claims, its denial of their pri-
macy in the face of an "otherwise permissible regulation" relegates
the liberty interests of marginal believers to secondary status. 4
This somehow perverts the operation of the first amendment's
right to religious freedom. The smaller and more unconventional
religions are more likely to experience intrusion by a seemingly
79 Id. at 1601. Justice Scalia wrongfully asserted that prior free exercise exemptions
were predicated on the presence of additional constitutional rights.
In Bowen v. Roy, the Court refused to exempt the daughter of a Native American
Church member from welfare regulations requiring the girl to obtain a social security num-
ber. 476 U.S. at 707-08. Bowen arguably mirrors Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, which the Court
read as additionally implicating the "right of parents ... to direct the education of their
children." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205).
Moreover, the Court has not automatically denied exemptions based solely on free exer-
cise. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court exempted Sabbatarians from a
state regulation conditioning unemployment benefits on a claimant's willingness to accept
any available job-including one requiring work on the Sabbath. Id. at 410. Sherbert is
nothing more than a bare free exercise claim. Any possible additional right, such as freedom
of association or speech, would apply equally to Smith's and Black's use of peyote.
8o Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 1614 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 1617-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 1606 ("leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a rela-
tive disadvantage those religious practices . . . not widely engaged in"); Ball, The Unfree
Exercise of Religion, 20 CAP. U.L. REV. 41, 56 (1991) (Smith leaves racial, political and
religious minorities only such protection "as may be granted them by the majority").
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"neutral" governmental action. They cannot claim the political ac-
commodation secured by the institutional churches. Free exercise,
however, should be understood to protect most vigorously the reli-
gious practices of marginal or unpopular groups, even against the
incidental or unanticipated effects of state action.85
In allowing only those free exercise claims that "piggyback"
onto other constitutional rights-summarily elevating the state in-
terest to a compelling level 8 8-the decision inherently subordinates
religious convictions, even those of "ultimate concern," to the au-
thority of the state.8 7 The majority in Smith not only subverts the
primacy afforded religion in the first amendment; it apparently
suggests that marginal or less familiar belief systems are not "reli-
gion" within the meaning of the first amendment.
"[A) diverse society remains pluralistically viable only if it
honors its diversity."8 8 Smith, however, dishonors and impairs the
pluralism envisioned by Madison. Mainstream religions will obtain
greater power through the reduced status of minority belief sys-
tems. More alarmingly, Smith's subverted free exercise analysis
leaves insecure the rights of unorthodox believers, which the clause
was intended to protect.8 ' Similar attempts to reshape first amend-
ment jurisprudence can be seen in the diversity of commentators'
definitional standards.
III. SCHOLARLY'COMMENTARY
Constitutional scholars sharply disagree on how-or
whether-to define religion,90 a controversy substantially engen-
11 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1418.
86 Note, supra note 20, at 133.
" Cf. infra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Ball's thesis that
religious liberty overrides and antedates state authority).
11 Lively, supra note 17.
89 See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (religion clauses assure "fullest possible" liberty and tolerance for all).
11 See Note, supra note 23, at 1060-66 (seminal article summarizing earlier doctrine on
definition of religion); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 55, at 1179-88 (advocating expansive
definition, from adherent's perspective, with central fixed meaning); Adams & Emmerich,
supra note 7, at 1666-68 (advocating unitary approach, focusing on essence or purpose, not
scope, of belief system); Choper, Defining Religion in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REv. 579, 612-13 (proposing narrow, functional definition highlighting free exercise clause);
Freeman, supra note 8, at 1563-65 (recommending no definition because religion has no
definable "essence"); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680, 1686-
87 (1969) (suggesting conventional definition for establishment clause, but heterodox version
to protect nonconformist conscience under free exercise); Greenawalt, supra note 55, at 762
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dered by the important consequences of such an undertaking. The
imprimatur of a definition of religion will convey the first amend-
ment's special protections and prohibitions, and will determine
precisely what practices are secured or banned.9 1 The interplay, or
"tension," between the two clauses further complicates the formu-
lation of a workable definition.92
Any definition of religion, according to some commentators,
would violate the establishment clause by delineating the perime-
ters of what religion should be.93 In addition, particular methods of
defining religion may impermissibly intrude on an individual's free
exercise. For example, fashioning a definition by reference to the
faith content of the adherent's belief would allow government to
authenticate religious "truth" that is beyond empirical knowl-
edge. 4 Moreover, looking to its structural content (i.e., whether its
form sufficiently resembles those of belief systems that we tradi-
tionally recognize as religion) may deny legitimacy to systems
(deriving constitutional definition from "closeness of analogy in the relevant respects be-
tween the disputed instance and what is indisputably religion"); Ingber, supra note 6, at
332-33 (advocating distinction between transcendent reality from which religious duties de-
rive and human judgment from which ideology results); Johnson, Concepts and Compro-
mise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 832 (1984) (finding no
satisfactory definition of religion either exists or is conceivable); Merel, The Protection of
Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment,
45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 830-40 (1978) (advocating binary approach: for free exercise, any
sincere multi-dimensional belief system; for establishment, sincere self-understanding of the
system and its use of religiously associated symbols required); Note, supra note 8, at 533-36
(proposing unitary functional definition specific enough to be helpful, yet broad enough to
apply to nontraditional belief systems); Note, Developments in the Law: Religion and the
State, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1609, 1638-39 (1987) [hereinafter Harvard Note] (advocating the-
ory of principled voluntarism to protect self-creation of identity); Note, The Myth of Reli-
gious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 152 (1985) [hereinafter
Virginia Note] (asserting religion's expansive meaning in state regulation of ideas, but nar-
row meaning in regulation of conduct); Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amend-
ment Definition of Religion, 61 TEx. L. REV. 139, 163-65 (1982) (proposing sociological defi-
nition grounded in sacred/profane distinction); Comment, supra note 62, at 359-62 (1989)
(advocating unitary definition of comprehensive belief system addressing ultimate concerns
on imponderable inquiries).
01 Adams & Emmerich, supra note 7.
02 See Ingber, supra note 6, at 234.
93 Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593,
604 (1964).
04 See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 84-87. In Ballard, Justice William 0. Douglas reasoned that
[m]en may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of
their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to
some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond
the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.
Id. at 86-87.
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shaped in an image different from the Judeo-Christian model.
More disturbingly, any content-based definition would likely ex-
clude unfamiliar, unpopular or marginal belief systems from the
protections unquestioningly extended to mainstream religions.95
Yet, an exhaustive functional definition, based on how the be-
lief system affects the adherent's life, may be so encompassing as
to be worthless. Its terms may transform any seriously held norma-
tive belief (i.e., a political, sociological, or philosophical creed) into
a religious one. Accordingly, a comprehensive functional definition
could effectively fail to differentiate the religious from the
nonreligious.9 6
Professor George Freeman finds any definitional approach un-
satisfactory. He strongly urges courts to abandon their miscon-
ceived attempts to define religion. In his view, the effort is point-
less; religion is without an "essence," or even a characteristic
common to all traditions or experiences that is reducible to defini-
tional terms.97 Rather, he asserts, religion has a focus98 and a set of
paradigmatic features99 that are themselves neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish the presence of religion. 100 For Freeman, reli-
gion exists independent of its attributes. Therefore, not only would
definition be impossible, it would also seriously undermine the
purposes of the first amendment. 101
Definitional indeterminancy, asserts Freeman, does not enfee-
ble courts in their ability to decide these difficult issues. Within his
proposed "sound framework," the attributional focus and paradig-
matic features will sufficiently enable courts to rightly determine
cases arising under the first amendment.0 2
01 See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1419-20 (mainstream institutional churches receive
ample protection in political arena).
"' See Harvard Note, supra note 90, at 1623 (religion defined as "pattern of symbols
that connote ultimate values" unhelpful).
91 See Freeman, supra note 8, at 1548.
98 Id. at 1553-54. Freeman characterizes the "focus" of religion as a response to "funda-
mental 'Why' questions." Id. at 1553.
" See id. at 1553-55. Freeman notes that most religious belief systems feature: (a) a
belief in a Supreme Being; (b) a belief in a transcendental reality; (c) a moral code; (d) a
world view situating humanity's place in the universe; (e) sacred rituals and events; (f) wor-
ship and prayer; (g) a sacred text; and (h) membership in a social institution promoting the
belief system. Id. at 1553. He acknowledges that the last four features are related to, and
usually dependent on, the first four. Id. However, he asserts that not even these (nor any
other set of features) is determinative of what constitutes religion. Id. at 1556-65.
100 Id. at 1553-54.
101 Id. at 1520.
102 See id. at 1562. Freeman maintains that any nondefinitional classification of religion
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Certainly, "[e]very definition is dangerous." 103 But Freeman's
"sound framework" seems little more than Judge Adams- "defini-
tion by analogy."104 He derives his focus and paradigmatic features
from a comparative analysis of accepted religions. His is a sophisti-
cated attempt to preclude courts from authenticating the unverifi-
able. However, Freeman's model will likely advance majoritarian
notions of religious belief to the detriment of unorthodox individ-
ual conscience.
Most commentators have adopted some form of functional ap-
proach, parallel to the Supreme Court's Tillichian analysis. Ac-
cording to one, "ultimate concern" represents the "essence of reli-
gion. 10 5 The "word 'concern' denotes the affective or motivational
aspect of human experience [while] the word 'ultimate' signifies
that the concern must be of an unconditional, absolute, or unquali-
fied character."106 According to this view, whatever the individual
identifies as her "ultimate" concern is her religion.
Another student author advocating a functional definition
criticizes the use of "ultimate concern. '107 He asserts that the test
would little assist in determining the individual's "single highest
concern" from among the hierarchy of concerns.1 8 Moreover, this
author argues, Tillichian concepts do not concentrate on the com-
prehensive inquiry into fundamental and ultimate questions that a
functional approach requires. "Ultimate concern" would therefore
scarcely aid the court in differentiating the religious from the
nonreligious.1 09
Professor James McBride would disagree. He asserts that the
application and interpretation of "ultimate concern" has miscon-
ceived Tillich's concept. In examining the theologian's work, he
finds that in addition to its "subjective dimension of affective atti-
tude," Tillich includes an objective dimension of transcendence. 1 0
will promote the aims of the religion clauses if courts: (a) focus on the fundamental concerns
of traditional believers; (b) rely on a paradigmatic model; and (c) emphasize a thorough
development of the relevant facts. Id.
103 R. STARK & C. GLOcK, AMERICAN PIETY: THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT 11
(1968) (quoting Erasmus).
104 See supra note 72 (discussing Judge Adams' definitional approach in Malnak and
Africa).
105 Note, supra note 23, at 1066.
106 Id. at 1066-67.
107 See Note, supra note 8, at 540-41.
1"8 Id. at 541.
109 Id. at 552.
110 McBride, supra note 49, at 270-71.
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"What makes 'ultimate concern' ultimate is not only the affective
attitude of the believer but also the object of belief which tran-
scends the form and contents of the empirically observable
world.""'
Applying Tillich's concept to judicial interpretation of religion
would therefore allow courts to examine, not the particulars of reli-
gious beliefs, but only their general character. Courts, in looking to
a belief's character, would determine whether its "ultimate con-
cern" has "an object which transcends the empirical form and con-
tents of the phenomenal world. 11 2 McBride rightfully contends
that this crucial feature will enable courts to distinguish the reli-
gious from the nonreligious.
Similarly, Professor Stanley Ingber recognizes the transcen-
dent quality of religion. He identifies the religious as that which
uniquely "acknowledges the existence of a sacred or transcendent
reality from which basic human obligations emanate.""-' Ingber,
however, advocates a unitary definition that explicitly excludes
mere ideological perspectives. He would establish a belief system's
religiosity by determining whether it derived from transcendent
values beyond human formulation." 4 Ingber, moreover, believes
that any legal definition must effectively separate the religious
from the irreligious-that which is hostile to religion." 5 Only then
will the undivided purposes of the religion clauses be served.'16
Most recently, Professor Milner Ball has implicitly questioned
the Court's adoption of the Tillichian standard of "ultimate con-
cern." 17 From a Protestant Christian stance, he employs theolo-
gian Karl Barth's concept of religion as "unbelief" to critique the
Church's acquiescence in state-sponsored definitions." 8 The
Church's complicity in procuring political protection for itself,
rather than advocating for humanity, has resulted in an erosion of
liberty:
Such freedom as the Church has is dependent upon the grace of
God rather than the largesse of the state. "The freedom of the
"I Id. at 270.
112 Id.
'Is Ingber, supra note 6, at 332.
114 Id.
Il Id. at 333.
116 Id.
17 See Ball, supra note 84, at 45-47.
I's See id.
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Church is not there where she has possibilities," Bonhoeffer said,
"but only where the Gospel actually and in its own power makes
room for itself on earth, even and exactly when no such possibili-
ties are offered to it. The essential freedom of the church is not a
gift of the world to the church; rather it is the freedom of the
Word of God itself to gain a hearing." Of course the state should
guarantee freedom for the proclamation of the Word of God inso-
far as the Word makes itself known through the Church. It
should do so, however, not for the benefit of the Church but for
the benefit of the state, although the stat6 will find the free
preaching of the Word discomfiting. 119
Initially, Professor Ball's theory seems problematic for the
definition of religion. It seems to resort to confessional elements
resolutely rejected by the Ballard and Torcaso decisions. Upon
closer examination, however, his ideas challenge our basic notions
of the origins of religious liberty.
Ball implies that leaving definitional duties to the Congress or
the Court only misidentifies the source and nature of religious free-
dom. To petition the government for freedom, or its restoration,
encourages the assumption that it is fundamentally a gift of the
state, rather than "the freedom of the Word of God itself to gain a
hearing."' 120 He contends, rather, that religious liberty exists inde-
pendent of and prior to any state authority.
In this, Ball mirrors the sentiments of another leading consti-
tutional scholar of the first amendment religion clauses, Professor
Michael McConnell. In his most recent work, he ponders the politi-
cal significance of the free exercise clause:
If government admits that God (whomever that may be) is sover-
eign, then it also admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedi-
ence of the citizens is partial and instrumental. Even the mighty
democratic will of the people is, in principle, subordinate to the
commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual
conscience.12 1
At the very least, a definition of religion must respect the primacy
of principled conscience; it must acknowledge the sovereign au-
thority, rooted in the transcendent, which precedes even the legiti-
mate power of the state.
119 Id. at 46 (footnotes omitted) (quoting author's translation of D. BONHOEFFER, 1
GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 323, 354 (1965)).
120 Id. at 55.
122 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1516.
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IV. TOWARD A PROPOSED DEFINITION
Any proposed definition is inherently problematic. Yet even
religion's complexity should not deter us from confronting the
"delicate task." '122 I firmly disavow any definition that reduces reli-
gion to simple, formulaic terms-thereby robbing it of its essential
dynamism. I believe, however, that we must begin consciously to
wrest from the configurative jurisprudence a synthesis that anchors
and integrates the necessarily conjunctive variables.
The establishment clause states the proper role of government
in a religiously plural society. It embodies a principle of govern-
mental separation from religious institutions, beliefs and prac-
tices.1 23 Too often, however, establishment clause review has
merely assumed that "[w]e are a religious people.' 1 24 That percep-
tion misdirects analysis toward majoritarian preferences and ortho-
doxy; it steers scrutiny away from the interests of diversity. 25
Because establishment clause review is clouded by the much-
criticized Lemon test, 26 courts may, in their definitional interpre-
tation, inordinately emphasize the practice's "secular purpose."
When confronted with unfamiliar belief systems, courts have
looked to external indicia to measure the systems' resemblance to
recognized religions. Such structural or content-based similarity
may influence a court to find that a belief system is a religion.127
On the other hand, courts may be persuaded that nontheistic sys-
tems, despite' their transcendent ultimacy, are more like personal
philosophies than the comprehensive religious beliefs approbrated
in Yoder.128 Such an ad hoc evaluation disserves the first
amendment.
The general goal of the religion clauses is to guarantee, "to
122 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
123 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 801-03 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
125 See Lively, supra note 17, at 696.
228 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Lemon test enunciated
three requirements that a government law or practice must meet: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.'" Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)) (citation omitted).
' See supra note 72 (discussing Scientology, Barber, and Malnak decisions). Such fac-
tors as a belief in a deity, an ordained ministerial clergy, a widespread following, a moral
code, sacred rituals and prayers, and a world view accounting for humanity's place in the
universe may help persuade a court that the belief system is indeed a religion. Id.
128 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
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promote and [to] assure the fullest possible scope of religious lib-
erty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which se-
cure the best hope of attainment of that end.' 129 The broad pur-
pose is not to insulate particular religious denominations, but
rather to safeguard religious-inspired beliefs and practices from
unwarranted governmental intrusion.
The constitutional mandate expresses a deliberate and considered
judgment that such matters are to be left to the conscience of the
citizen, and declares as a basic postulate of the relation between
the citizen and his government that "the rights of conscience are,
in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gen-
tlest touch of governmental hand . .. ."110
Accordingly, any proposed constitutional definition should be suffi-
ciently broad and flexible to welcome changing concepts of reli-
gion, thereby ensuring the protection of unfamiliar and unortho-
dox religious beliefs, no matter what "new age" they may usher in.
A definition of religion should also be singular; the free exer-
cise clause must necessarily be read in concert with the establish-
ment clause, "in light of the single end which they are designed to
serve."'' It would be anomalous indeed to prohibit under the es-
tablishment clause that which is unprotected by free exercise anal-
ysis. This unitary approach avoids two potential difficulties arising
under a bifurcated definition. It both comports with the language
and structure of the first amendment, and it yields far less capri-
cious and discriminatory results.'
Nor should the religious be confused with that which is simply
moral or normative. In confusing or even equating the normative
(that which ought to be) with the religious (that which transcends),
we have distorted the first amendment's perspective. It is not di-
rected at mere human ideologies but transcendent beliefs. 13 3 This
requires a definition of sufficient specificity to assist courts in iden-
tifying those belief systems our Constitution is intended to protect.
1' School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
"' Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Rep. Daniel Carroll of Maryland dur-
ing debate on the proposed Bill of Rights in the First Congress, Aug. 15, 1789, I Ann. of
Cong. 730).
131 Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring). But see Merel, supra note 90, at 835-39 (bifur-
cated approach); Virginia Note, supra note 90 (definition bifurcated by regulation's target).
122 Note, supra note 8, at 535-36.
122 See Ingber, supra note 6, at 291-94 (ideology not protected by free exercise but by
free speech and association).
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The "ultimate concern" definition, as properly understood, re-
mains the most appropriate judicial standard by which to assess a
belief system's status under the first amendment. It would inquire
whether the materials or methods adopted by the government are
"advancing any truth claims about the objective nature of the
transcendent.' ' 3 4 The affective attitude, as evidenced by the ad-
herents' experiences, would be insufficient in itself to confer first
amendment status on the beliefs. 135 If understood in strict Til-
lichian terms, the theory has a number of advantages.
The approach avoids religious ethnocentrism by not specifying
the required content of religious belief. Neither does it reinforce or
elevate familiar religions by applying a "resemblance" criterion;
rather, it eschews using structure as the standard against which to
measure the validity of new or unfamiliar systems. By emphasizing
the objective dimension of transcendent "thatness," as well as the
subjective one of affective attitude, the approach prevents courts
from verifying the "truth" of religious belief. 36 Finally, because an
ultimate concern is unconditioned and therefore insuperable, shel-
tering such concerns from governmental interference furthers the
goal of not subjecting adherents to the "hard choice between con-
travening [the] imperatives of religion and conscience or suffering
[the] penalties.' 3 7
Admittedly, my definition is not all encompassing; it does not
account for the contribution and significant perspective of Ethical
Culture. Perhaps in my line-drawing, I have excluded some belief
systems that function, in society as well as in an individual's life,
as the foundational source which the framers understood religion
to be. Perhaps an expansive nontranscendental model would yield
greater liberty while preserving analytical cohesiveness. At the very
least, this Note encourages the judiciary to make explicit its defini-
tional standard. A transformed Tillichian perspective is a good
place to start.38
"' McBride, supra note 49, at 271.
"' See id. at 272 (affective attitude alone insufficient to establish religious belief).
13' See McBride, supra note 49, at 270 (because Tillich's "ultimate concern" distin-
guishes between religion and nonreligion, its application does not compel courts to "probe
truth of religious belief").
137 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 445 (1971).
'38 At least one commentator suggests that, whatever its benefits, the adoption of Til-
lich's concepts imposes unfamiliar German Romantic presuppositions onto American reli-
gion jurisprudence. McBride, supra note 49, at 268-69. Indeed, the contour of German Ro-
manticism is a landscape unfamiliar to, and chronologically distinct from, our
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V. CONCLUSION
Madison comprehended factions in society-including reli-
gious ones-as contributing to our nation's order and stability.139
The first amendment must be interpreted to protect the interests
of those minorities and thereby encourage the flourishing of reli-
gious factions.
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order.140
Any constitutional definition of religion must therefore pre-
serve the unique identity and character of minority religious
groups. Unable to win accommodation within the political process,
their religious liberty is especially endangered. If definitional stan-
dards do not safeguard against their assimilation into our secular
culture, then the first amendment's fundamental guarantees will
be lost to us all.
m. elisabeth bergeron
Enlightenment-derived foundations. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1430-55. Perhaps,
however, German Romantic notions will most precisely preserve the religious pluralism en-
visioned by the framers.
McConnell, supra note 18, at 1515.
W40 est Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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